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THE STANDING OF THE UNITED STATES: 
HOW CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS SHOW 
THAT STANDING DOCTRINE IS 
LOOKING FOR ANSWERS IN ALL 
THE WRONG PLACES 
Edward A. Hartnett* 
J. BACKGROUND TO A PUZZLE 
The Supreme Court insists that Article III of the Constitution 
requires a litigant to have standing in order for her request for judi­
cial intervention to constitute a "case" or "controversy" within the 
jurisdiction of a federal court; it also insists that the "irreducible 
constitutional minimum" of standing requires (1) that the litigant 
suffer an "injury in fact"; (2) that the person against whom the judi­
cial intervention is sought have caused the injury; and (3) that the 
requested judicial intervention redress the injury.1 The requisite in­
jury in fact, the Court repeatedly declares, must be "personal,"2 
"concrete and particularized,"3 and "actual or imminent, not con­
jectural or hypothetical."4 
* Visiting Associate Professor (Fall 1998), Scholar in Residence (Spring 1999), 
University of Virginia School of Law; Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law; A.B. 
1982, Harvard College; J.D. 1985, New York University School of Law. - Ed. Thanks to 
Evan Caminker, John Harrison, John Jeffries, and Robert Pushaw for helpful comments. 
1. See, e.g., Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 119 S. 
Ct. 765, 772 (1999); Federal Election Commn. v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1784-87 (1998); Steel 
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1008 (1998); B,ennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 
160-62 (1997); United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, 517 
U.S. 544, 551 (1996); Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors v. 
City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1993); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560-61 (1992); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 542 (1986); Allen 
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1982) (citations omitted for all 
sources). 
2. See, e.g., Department of Commerce, 119 S. Ct. at 772; Clinton v. City of New York, 118 
S. Ct. 2091, 2099 (1998); Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2317 (1997); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 
& n.1; Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (noting that the 
"gist of the question of standing" is whether the litigant has "a personal stake in the out­
come") (citations omitted for all sources). 
3. See, e.g., Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2317; United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995); 
Associated Gen. Contractors, 508 U.S. at 663; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations omitted for all 
sources). 
4. See, e.g., Hays, 515 U.S. at 743; Associated Gen. Contractors, 508 U.S. at 663; Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 560 (citations omitted for all sources). 
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In addition, the injury must be more than an "injury to the inter­
est in seeing that the law is obeyed."5 This requirement has its 
foundation in the bar against standing to litigate a '"generalized 
grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large 
class of citizens."6 For a time, the bar on '"generalized griev­
ance[s]"' was viewed as merely a "prudential rule[]," not required 
by Article III and therefore subject to displacement by Congress.7 
The Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Lujan, however, treated it as 
a gloss on the injury requirement and rooted in the case or contro­
versy language of Article III. 8 The Court insisted, as an Article III 
matter, that the injury must be to something more than "every citi­
zen's interest in the proper application of the Constitution and 
laws," and the litigant must not be "seeking relief that no more di­
rectly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large."9 
Last year, the Court acknowledged that this bar on generalized 
grievances has been treated sometimes as a constitutional limit and 
sometimes as a prudential limit on standing.10 Significantly, it did 
not choose between characterizations, but instead subdivided the 
bar on generalized grievances into a prudential rule and a constitu­
tional rule. The prudential rule counsels hesitation before finding 
standing because "a political forum may be more readily available 
where an injury is widely shared."11 The constitutional rule re­
quires that the injury not be "of an abstract and indefinite nature -
for example, harm to the 'common concern for obedience to 
5. Akins, 118 S. Ct. at 1786. 
6. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975) (describing bar on standing "when the 
asserted harm is a 'generalized grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a 
large class of citizens" as a "prudential rule[ ]") (citations omitted); see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 
751. 
7. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500; Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. 
8. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74 ("We have consistently held that a plaintiff ... claiming only 
harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, 
and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at 
large - does not state an Article III case or controversy."). Justice Kennedy's concurrence 
specifically noted: 
The Court's holding . . .  is a direct and necessary consequence of the case and contro­
versy limitations found in Article III. [I]t would exceed those limitations if • . .  in the 
absence of any showing of concrete injury, we were to entertain citizen suits to vindicate 
the public's nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws. While it does 
not matter how many persons have been injured by the challenged action, the party 
bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete and personal way. 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
9. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74. 
10. See Akins, 118 S. Ct. at 1785 ("Whether styled as a constitutional or prudential limit 
on standing, the Court bas sometimes determined that where large numbers of Americans 
suffer alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process, may provide the more 
appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance."). 
11. Akins, 118 S. Ct. at 1786 (noting that the availability of a political forum to redress 
widely shared injuries "counsel[s] against, say, interpreting a statute as conferring standing"). 
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law."'12 Later in the same passage, the Court purported to provide 
another "example" of such an "abstract" harm, but instead simply 
repeated that the harm cannot be "injury to the interest in seeing 
that the law is obeyed."13 
Numerous scholars have demonstrated that insistence on a 'per­
sonal injury in fact as a requirement of Article III is a relatively 
recent invention.14 They point to a long history in English courts, in 
the courts of the several states, and in the federal courts themselves 
of judicial proceedings brought by those who have not suffered any 
such individualized injury in fact. For example, the prerogative 
writs of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari, as well as qui tam, 
relator, and informer actions, could all be brought by litigants who 
had suffered no injury in fact.1s 
12. Akins, 118 S. Ct. at 1785 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also 
Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 
147 U. PA. L. RE.v. 613, 617 (1999) (noting that the Court inAkins "made clear, for the first 
time, that Congress can grant standing to someone who suffers a quite generalized injury"); 
id. at 636 (describing the Court's "key step" as distinguishing between injuries that are 
"widely shared" and "injuries that are 'abstract and indefinite,' . . .  such as an injury 'to the 
interest in seeing that the law is obeyed"'); The Supreme Court 1997 Term, Leading Cases, 
Federal Jurisdiction & Procedure, 112 HARv. L. RE.v. 253, 260 (1998) [hereinafter Leading 
Cases] (suggesting that Akins can be read "as embracing a definition of injury distinctly 
broader and more accommodating than that in Lujan - a definition that distinguishes be­
tween widely shared 'concrete' injuries . . .  that are sufficient to confer standing and widely 
shared 'abstract' injuries that are not"). 
13. Akins, 118 S. Ct. at 1786. 
14. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Re­
quirement?, 78 YALE LJ. 816 (1969) ; William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 
YALE LJ. 221, 224-25 (1988); Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen As Litigant in Public Actions: The 
Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. RE.v. 1033 (1968) ; Cass R. Sunstein, 
Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. RE.v. 1432 (1988) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Public Law]; Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "In­
juries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. RE.v. 1 63, 166 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, What's Stand­
ing] (standing doctrine is "essentially an invention of federal judges, and recent ones at 
that"); Steven L. Wmter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 
STAN. L. RE.v. 1371 (1988). 
15. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 14, at 819 (prohibition), 820 (certiorari), 823 (quo war­
ranto), 825-26 (informers or qui tam); Jaffe, supra note 14, at 1035 (prohibition, certiorari, 
mandamus); Sunstein, What's Standing, supra note 14, at 170-79; Wmter, supra note 14, at 
1396 (mandamus, prohibition, certiorari), 1404 (mandamus in federal court), 1406-09 (in­
former or qui tam). But see Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English Prerogative Writs: 
The Original Understanding, 63 BROOK. L. RE.v.1001, 1008 (1997) (arguing that "a 'personal 
stake' or standing was indeed necessary to invoke the power of English courts in prerogative 
proceedings during the eighteenth century"). In reaching this conclusion, however, Clanton 
frequently observes that such actions "were brought by a relator in the name of the king" and 
were "understood to be the king's suit." Id. at 1033; see also id. at 1037 (contending that 
"fatal flaw" in Berger's argument is that quo warranto information, as a relator action, "was 
understood to be the suit of the king"); id. at 1041 (noting that "relator actions . . .  were 
understood to be the king's actions"). In such circumstances, Clanton simply deems the rela­
tor's standing to be "irrelevant." Id. at 1037-38; 1042. This declaration does nothing to un­
dermine the idea that the relators could initiate such actions without themselves having 
suffered an injury. 
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Most scholars reach the same conclusion from this history as 
Justice Harlan did in his dissent in Flast v. Cohen:1 6 there is nothing 
in the "judicial power," or "cases" and "controversies" language 
that requires the person bringing the action to suffer an injury in 
fact.17 For better or worse, however, the judges of the "inferior" 
federal courts do not feel so free to disregard Supreme Court prece­
dent.18 Their difficulty in following this precedent has been acute in 
cases where the ancient forms persist, particularly qui tam actions. 
In a qui tam action, an individual who has herself suffered no 
harm brings an action on her own behalf as well as on behalf of the 
government. Indeed, the term qui tam is short for "qui tam pro 
domino rege quam pro se ipso sequitur" - "who as well for the 
lord the king as for himself sues."19 The individual bringing the 
action is typically called an "informer" or a "relator."20 As the 
Supreme Court explained in 1905: 
Statutes providing for actions by a common informer, who himself 
had no interest whatever in the controversy other than that given by 
statute, have been in existence for hundreds of years in England, and 
in this country ever since the foundation of our Government. The 
right to recover the penalty or forfeiture granted by the statute is fre-
16. 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) {Harlan, J., dissenting) (pointing, in part, to the history of qui 
tam actions, and noting that "[t]his and other federal courts have repeatedly held that indi­
vidual litigants, acting as private attorneys-general, may have standing as 'representatives of 
the public interest"' and that it is "clear that non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs ... are not constitu­
tionally excluded from the federal courts" (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio v. Commn., 316 
U.S. 4, 14 {1942))). See also F/ast, 392 U.S. at 130 (concluding that public actions are "within 
the jurisdiction conferred upon the federal courts by Article III .. . "). 
17. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 14, at 840 {"In sum, the notion that the constitution de­
mands injury to a personal interest as a prerequisite to attacks on allegedly unconstitutional 
action is historically unfounded . ... There may well be policy arguments in favor of a 'per­
sonal interest' limitation on standing, but they cannot rest on historically-derived constitu­
tional compulsions."); Jaffe, supra note 14, at 1043 {"The burden of my argument . . •  has 
been that there are no compelling constitutional reasons for denying jurisdiction of citizen 
and taxpayer actions. It is almost impossible any longer to contend that a Hohfeldian plain­
tiff is a necessary element of a case or controversy."); Sunstein, Public Law, supra note 14, at 
1478-79 (presenting view that Article III requires an injury in fact is "misguided"); Winter, 
supra note 14, at 1374 ("A fuller account of our history shows that article III was not limited 
to the kinds of private disputes characterized by standing."). See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REv. 343, 385 (1993) (noting that 
"a standing doctrine that is rooted in the requirement of injury in fact lacks intellectual 
coherence"). 
18. See generally Evan Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Prece­
dents?, 46 STAN. L. REv. 817 (1994). 
19. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY {2d ed. 1989); see also 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTA· 
RIES 160 {facsimile of first edition 1768) (U. Chi. Press 1979) (giving full Latin as "qui tam 
pro domino rege, &c., pro seipso in hac parte sequitur," thus indicating that the action was 
brought only "in part" ("in hac parte") for himself but also for the king and the rest ("&c.") 
- presumably the rest of the co=unity); cf. Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutional­
ity of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 341 n.1 {1989) (providing a slightly different 
version). 
20. See Caminker, supra note 19, at 341-42 n.1. 
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quently given to the first common informer who brings the action, 
although he has no interest in the matter except as informer.21 
Although qui tam statutes have been part of federal law from the 
first Congress,22 the major such statute in current use is the False 
Claims Act.2 3 The False Claims Act permits any person to sue a 
. defendant accused of defrauding the government and, if successful, 
to keep a percentage of the amount recovered.2 4  
Current standing doctrine and deeply rooted qui tam practice 
are on a collision course. It is not surprising that qui tam defend­
ants have argued that current standing doctrine renders the qui tam 
provision of the False Claims Act unconstitutional. Nor is it sur­
prising that federal courts have almost universally rebuffed the 
challenges to such a long-standing practice. Indeed, courts fre­
quently use the argument of historical pedigree to uphold the con­
stitutionality of qui tam actions.2 5 As one court put it, "The 
concept of qui tam is so deeply rooted in the nation's history that it 
is most improbable that any court today could divine some infirmity 
of constitutional magnitude which would not have been equally ap­
parent many decades, if not centuries, ago."2 6 
One bold district court held the qui tam provision of the False 
Claims Act unconstitutional, brushing aside its historical roots by 
candidly noting that the Supreme Court's current standing doctrine 
is a recent invention.27 But other courts, seeking to reconcile the 
21. See Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905) (rejecting a constitutional attack on a 
state statute because to accept it "would be in effect to hold invalid all legislation providing 
for proceedings in the nature of qui tam actions"); see also United States ex rel. Marcus v. 
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943) (rejecting an argument that qui tam statutes are judicially 
disfavored and should be strictly construed, and noting that "[q]ui tam suits have been fre­
quently permitted by legislative action, and have not been without defense by the courts" 
(footnotes omitted)). 
22. See Caminker, supra note 19, at 342-43. 
23. 31 u.s.c. §§ 3729-3733 (1994). 
24. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(l) ("A person may bring a civil action for a violation of sec­
tion 3729 for the person and for the United States Government."). In general, if the execu­
tive branch of the United States intervenes in the action, the relator's recovery ranges from 
15 to 25 percent; if it does not intervene, the range is 25 to 30 percent. See 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(d). 
25. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Milam v. University of Texas, 961 F.2d 46, 49 (4th Cir. 
1992); see also United States ex rel Hall v. Tribal Development Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1212-13 
(7th Cir. 1995) (upholding standing to bring a qui tam action under 25 U.S.C. §§ 81 & 201). 
26. United States ex rel Rudd v. Gen. Contractors, No. C-89- 397-R JM, at 4 (E.D. Wash. 
Dec. 4, 1990), quoted in United States ex rel Burch v. Piqua Engineering, 803 F. Supp. 115, 
117 n.2 (S.D. Ohio 1992). 
27. See United States ex rel Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 982 F. Supp. 1261, 1267 
(S.D. Tex. 1997) ("The Court's modem conception of standing, as an Article III requirement, 
did not come into being until relatively recently." (citing James T. Blanch, Note, The Consti­
tutionality of the False Claims Act's Qui Tam Provision, 16 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL. 701, 721-
22 (1993))); see also Blanch, supra, at 723 ("To point at history and argue that standing doc­
trine cannot screen out qui tam actions is to ignore the fact that at one time Article III had an 
entirely different screening mechanism than it has now."); Thomas R. Lee, Co=ent, The 
Standing of Qui Tam Realtors Under the False Claims Act, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 543, 549 (1990) 
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history of qui tam actions with current standing doctrine, bend over 
backwards (indeed, so far as to create a circle) in their eagerness to 
find an injury in fact. Some conclude that the bounty provided to a 
qui tam relator somehow constitutes an injury in fact.28 Although 
the Supreme Court itself may have encouraged such an approach 
by distinguishing qui tam actions from "citizen suits" along these 
lines,29 it has aptly been described by one district judge as "put[ ting] 
the cart before the horse."30 Ironically, that same judge traced a 
different circle to find an injury in fact, reasoning that a qui tam 
relator is injured because she runs the risk of retaliation for filing 
the qui tam action itself.31 
The most interesting approach taken by some courts (or at least 
the one of most significance for this article) is not to look for an 
injury in fact to the qui tam relator, but instead to look for an injury 
in fact to the United States and treat the relator as either a repre­
sentative or an assignee of the United States.32 In the cases covered 
("Standing is a modem game, and courts that uphold qui tam on historical grounds are play­
ing by archaic rules. "). 
28. See, e.g., United States ex reL Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc, 714 F. Supp. 1084, 
1098-99 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (concluding that the bounty is enough to create an injury in fact); 
Public Interest Bounty Hunters v. Board of Governors, 548 F. Supp. 157, 161 (N.D. Ga. 1982) 
(concluding that because of bounty, qui tam plaintiff "has suffered 'injury' of the constitu­
tional magnitude required "). 
29. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1992) (distinguishing from 
citizen suits "the unusual case in which Congress has created a concrete private interest in the 
outcome of a suit against a private party for the Government's benefit, by providing a cash 
bounty for the victorious plaintiff'). 
30. Burch, 803 F. Supp. at 118. Such a legislatively-created bounty can be (and may have 
been) understood to give the informer a property interest, see Clanton, supra note 15, at 
1040, but it is circular to count such a bounty as itself an "injury. " 
31. See, e.g., Burch, 803 F. Supp. at 119 (finding standing based on "potential ramifica­
tions to their employment status by initiating an action under the FCA "). 
32. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Development Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1213 
(1995) (noting "that the United States is the real plaintiff in qui tam actions " and treating the 
relator as the government's representative); United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 
743, 748 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he FCA effectively assigns the government's claims to qui tam 
plaintiffs . . . .  "); Stillwell, 714 F. Supp. at 1097 (observing that the "private plaintiff' is "in 
effect, suing on the injury to the United States "); United States ex rel. Amin v. George Wash­
ington University, 26 F. Supp. 2d 162, 168 n.1 (D.D.C. 1998) ("The relator merely acts as the 
United States' agent in pursuing the claim."). See generally Caminker, supra note 19, at 381-
83 (treating qui tam relator as representative of United States and analogous to a partial 
assignment); Lee, supra note 27, at 563-68 (treating qui tam relator as government's 
assignee). 
One result of this approach is that it seems to authorize qui tam actions against states, 
despite the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Stevens v. State of Vermont 
Agency of Natural Resources, 162 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that qui tam suit is not 
barred by Eleventh Amendment), cert. granted, 119 S.Ct. 2391 (1999). But see United States 
ex reL Foulds v. Texas Tech. Univ., 171 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that state retained 
Eleventh Amendment immunity against qui tam relator); Stevens, 162 F.3d at 224 (Weinstein, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that "[w]hile the notion of a qui tam relator 'standing in the shoes of 
the United States may be sufficient to confer standing, it is not sufficient to effect a transfer 
of the federal government's exemption from state sovereign immunity "). Cf. United States 
ex rel. Long v. SCS Business & Tech. Inst., 173 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that states 
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by the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, the injury to the 
United States is easy to see: if it has been defrauded, it has lost 
money - a classic injury in fact.3 3 
Notice the assumption of this approach: the United States, no 
less than any other litigant, must have suffered an injury in fact in 
order for litigation brought on its behalf to constitute a case or con­
troversy within the federal judicial power.3 4 Of course, this seems a 
reasonable assumption for a lower federal court to make. After all, 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted that the words "case" or 
"controversy" in Article III require an injury in fact.3 5 And nothing 
in Article III remotely suggests that the United States can litigate 
something other than a "case" or "controversy" in an Article III 
court. 
Despite its apparent reasonableness under current Supreme 
Court doctrine, I submit that no federal judge, if pressed, would 
seriously contend that Article III requires that the United States 
must suffer an injury in fact that is "personal," "concrete and partic­
ularized," and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical" 
before litigation on its behalf can be brought in federal court. And 
no federal judge would contend that injury to the United States be 
more than an "abstract ... injury to the interest in seeing that the 
law is obeyed . . . .  "3 6 My point of pressure is a federal criminal 
prosecution. That is, while Akhil Amar has argued that "too few of 
those who write in criminal procedure do serious, sustained scholar­
ship in constitutional law generally, or in fields like federal jurisdic-
are not "persons" within meaning of the False Claims Act). See generally Jonathan R. Siegel, 
The Hidden Source of Congress's Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEXAS L. 
REv. 539 (1995) (relying on qui tam history to argue that Congress can abrogate state sover­
eign immunity by authorizing private persons to bring suit in the name of the United States). 
The Court's recent decision in Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999), suggests that it is not 
likely to regard qui tam suits as sufficient to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity for rea­
sons rooted in Article II. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267 (distinguishing individual action from 
one "commenced and prosecuted against a State in the name of the United States by those 
who are entrusted with the constitutional duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe­
cuted,' U.S. CONST. art. II§ 3"). 
33. For a discussion of the Article II implications of treating the relator as a representa­
tive of the United States, see infra text accompanying notes 92-97. 
34. See, e.g., Hal� 49 F.3d at 1213 ("[I]t is enough that the United States, as the repre­
sented party, has been injured."); Kelly, 9 F.3d at 748 ([Q]ui tam plaintiffs "may sue based 
upon an injury to the federal treasury."); United States ex reL Kreindler v. United Technolo­
gies, 985 F.2d 1148, 1154 (2nd Cir. 1993) (plaintiff in qui tam action "invokes the standing of 
the government resulting from the fraud injury"); United States ex rel. Milam v. University of 
Texas, 961 F.2d 46, 49 (4th Cir. 1992) ("The government, and not the relator, must have 
suffered the 'injury in fact' required for Article III standing."); Amin, 26 F. Supp. at 168 n.l 
("In a qui tam action, the United States suffers the injury and remains the true plaintiff, the 
party whose standing is at issue . . . .  "). But see Lee, supra note 27, at 570 (claiming that 
standing doctrine makes an "exception" to the injury requirement "where the government 
itself acts as plaintiff"). 
35. For examples, see the cases cited supra in notes 1-3. 
36. Federal Election Commn. v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1786 (1998). 
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tion and remedies,"37 I suggest that constitutional law, federal 
jurisdiction, and remedies might learn something from criminal pro­
cedure. By focusing in Part II on criminal prosecutions, a common­
place legal proceeding familiar to today's lawyers and judges, my 
hope is that those who have been unmoved by the history of pre­
rogative writs and qui tam actions will see that Article III cannot 
require an injury in fact.38 Similarly, I use criminal procedure to 
show in Part III that the separation of powers issues now treated 
under the rubric of Article III standing are better understood as 
issues of Article I and Article II. 
II. CRIMINAL CA SES AND THE NONSENSE OF REQUIRING 
INJURY IN FACT UNDER ARTICLE III 
Suppose a new assistant federal defender, steeped in the 
Supreme Court's modern standing doctrine, moves to dismiss each 
of the prosecutions brought against her clients on the grounds that 
the United States lacks standing. She argues that the United States 
lacks a personal, concrete, and particularized injury in fact and 
therefore there is no case or controversy within the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts. 
I suppose that the first reaction would be the one I received as a 
new assistant federal defender when, at my first court appearance, I 
argued that my client - a previously deported alien charged with 
illegal reentry into the United States with whom I had little or no 
time to speak beforehand - was not a flight risk because the ac­
tions of which he was accused demonstrated that he really wanted 
to be in this country.39 But after the laughter subsided, what would 
the prosecutor and the judge say? What is the "concrete and partic­
ularized" injury in fact suffered by the United States that gives it 
standing to bring a criminal prosecution? 
Some crimes, of course, cause an actual, concrete, particularized 
injury to the United States. For example, when someone steals 
property belonging to the United States,40 the United States suffers 
such an injury - just as some courts in qui tam cases observe that 
the United States suffers such an injury when it is defrauded of 
money. But in the vast majority of criminal prosecutions, the 
37. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 115 (1997). 
38. Cf. Maxwell Steams, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PENN. 
L. REv. 309, 446 {1995) (treating standing of criminal defendants as "core" example of cases 
in which litigants are "interested in seeking relief on their own with no larger agenda"). 
39. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides for the temporary detention of anyone "not a 
citizen of the United States or lawfully admitted for permanent residence" who "may flee," 
18 U.S.C. § 3142{d) (1994), so there was little hope of success with more conventional argu· 
ments at this first judicial appearance. 
40. See 18 U. S.C. § 641 ("Whoever . .. steals . .. any record, voucher, money, or thing of 
value of the United States" shall be fined and imprisoned.). 
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United States is not seeking redress for this kind of an injury to 
itself. 
Perhaps one might be tempted to say that the injury in fact re­
quired by Article III is the one suffered by the victim of the crime: 
for example, the person who was kidnapped and taken across state 
lines41 or the person who was defrauded by a pyramid scheme using 
the U.S. Mails.42 On this theory, the United States has a form of 
third-party standing allowing it to redress the injuries suffered by 
others. But this approach is deeply flawed. If the United States 
had third-party standing, one would expect the "first-party" - the 
victim - to have standing. But our long-standing practice (albeit 
one not required by Article III) is that the victim of the crime may 
not bring a federal criminal prosecution.43 And criminal punish­
ments such as probation, incarceration, and fines payable to the 
United States do little to redress injuries suffered by the victim.44 
Moreover, in the most common federal prosecution - possession 
and sale of illegal drugs45 - there is no identifiable victim at all. 
Alternatively, although this may not come with good grace from 
a prosecutor, one might try to shift the focus to the defendant and 
contend that the relevant injury is the one that the government is 
seeking to impose on the defendant.46 This dodge cannot succeed 
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201 ("Whoever unlawfully ... kidnaps ... any person ... when the 
person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign co=erce" shall be punished by 
imprisonment.). 
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 ("Whoever, having devised ... a scheme or artifice to defraud 
... for the purpose of executing such scheme ... places in any post office or authorized 
depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever" shall be fined and imprisoned.). 
43. See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Les­
sons From History, 38 AM. U. L .  REv. 275, 293 (noting that Judiciary Act of 1789 "implicitly 
vested the district attorneys with exclusive authority to prosecute all federal crimes within 
their jurisdiction"); id. at 292, 296 (noting that " Congress never vested victims with a general 
right to prosecute defendants under federal criminal provisions" and that although "citizens 
in the first years under the Constitution evidently presented evidence of crimes directly to 
the grand jury," even if the grand jury indicted, the district attorney retained control and 
could drop the prosecution). Krent also argues that qui tam actions were considered "quasi­
criminal." Id. at 296-303. 
44. Cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a B etter Envt., 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1019 (1998) ("[A]lthough 
a suitor may derive great comfort and joy from the fact that the United States Treasury is not 
cheated, that a wrongdoer gets his just deserts, or that the nation's laws are faithfully en­
forced, that psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable Article ill remedy because it does not 
redress a cognizable Article ill injury."). But see Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1029 ( Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that "imposing a sanction on the wrongdoer ... minimize[s] the risk that 
harm-causing conduct will be repeated"). 
45. See 21 U.S.C. § 841. "Drug cases ... now occupy one-third of the federal court 
caseload" of crimes. TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CruM!NAL LAW, AMERICAN 
BAR AssoCIATION, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 20 (1998). In the federal crimi­
nal cases closed in 1997, more than 35% of defendants were charged with drug offenses, 
double the next highest category. Id. at 89 (table indicating 35.3% for drug laws and 17.1 % 
for fraud). 
46. Cf. Steams, supra note 38, at 441-42 (noting that a criminal defendant has standing to 
challenge his conviction and that "[u]nless the courts address the claims on the merits, the 
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without destroying the doctrine, however, because any defendant in 
any litigation - including Secretary Lujan - is threatened with an 
injury to liberty or property by an adverse judgment. If the injury 
threatened to a defendant by the litigation itself suffices to establish 
the plaintiff's standing to bring the action, then the standing re­
quirement is truly an empty one. 
At this point, even a patient judge (or reader) might be ready to 
throw up her hands and say, "The United States isn't any ordinary 
litigant. A federal criminal prosecution is not designed to remedy 
the injury to any particular victim, but rather to remedy an injury 
done to the community. It is wrong to try to shoehorn the United 
States in the mold of a common law private litigant. It is the sover­
eign, seeking to vindicate the general public interest in compliance 
with the law."47 
I agree, but it still does not solve the problem under current 
standing doctrine.48 For the very point of the current doctrine is to 
exclude from federal court those who seek to vindicate the general 
public interest in compliance with the law, to treat an injury to 
"every citizen's interest in the proper application of the Constitu­
tion and the laws" as insufficient to invoke federal judicial power, 
and to insist that Article III prevents Congress from authorizing 
litigation where the "harm at issue is . . .  of an abstract and indefi­
nite nature - for example, harm to the common concern for obedi­
ence to law."49 In short, if current standing doctrine is correct, then 
the vast majority of federal criminal prosecutions are not "cases" or 
"controversies" and the United States lacks standing to initiate 
them. 
convicted criminal will incur the most severe consequences that the state or federal govern­
ment can impose "). 
47. See Lee, supra note 27, at 569 ("The government certainly has standing in criminal 
cases .. .. "); Siegel, supra note 32, at 554 ("The United States is generally a proper party to 
bring suit to enforce federal law . . .. "); cf. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State 
Standing, 81 VA. L. REv. 387, 392 (1995) (noting that when a state "prosecutes criminal and 
civil actions under its own laws in its own courts, no issue ordinarily arises as to its standing "). 
A closely related argument would posit certain "personal " interests unique to the sover­
eign. While perhaps this might have some force in a monarchy in which sovereignty is per­
sonified in the king, cf. Clanton, supra note 15, at 1038 ("[T)he king was clearly the most 
interested party in executing the criminal laws."), it is not persuasive in a nation established 
on the principle that governments "deriv[e] their just power from the consent of the gov­
erned, " DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) , and whose constitution is 
made in the name of "We the People." U.S. CoNST. preamble. 
48. Cf. Lee, supra note 27, at 570 (contending that the government has "special constitu­
tional status as plaintiff ... and it need not show a particularized injury as a predicate to 
sue."); Larry W. Yackle, Worthy Champions of Fourteenth Amendment Rights: The United 
States As Parens Patriae, 92 Nw. L. REv. 111, 135-37 (1997) (suggesting that since modem 
standing doctrine was created to protect the executive, it "makes little sense, then, to tum 
standing doctrine against the Executive . .. "). 
49. Federal Election Commn. v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1785 (1998) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
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Of course, this is an absurd result. Article III cannot sensibly be 
read to prohibit the United States from vindicating its sovereign 
interests in its own courts. Removed from its context and recast as 
a general principle, then, Chief Justice Marshall's assertion that 
"[t]he province of the judiciary is, solely, to decide on the rights of 
individuals" is simply wrong.50 So, too, is Justice Scalia's assertion 
that "[v]indicating the public interest ... is the function of Congress 
and the Chief Executive,"51 with courts restricted to "protecting in­
dividuals and minorities against impositions of the majority .... "52 
Courts do not exist solely to resolve private disputes or to re­
solve claims by injured individuals against the government or gov­
ernment officials. Instead, as criminal prosecutions attest, a 
significant role of courts is simply to enforce the sovereign's law in 
particular cases.s3 
One caveat is in order. Article III extends the judicial power of 
the United States to certain "cases"54 as well as certain "controver­
sies."55 A number of scholars suggest that the term "cases" in 
Article III includes criminal prosecutions, while the term "contro­
versies" does not.56 If they are right, then the foregoing critique, 
relying as it does on the example of criminal prosecutions, shows 
only that the word "case" in Article III cannot reasonably be un­
derstood to require a personal, concrete, and particularized injury 
50. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). 
51. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992). 
52. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing As an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 894 (1983). 
53. See Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 1001, 
1005 (1965) (noting that "government cannot be run without the use of courts for the en­
forcement of coercive sanctions"). 
54. U.S. CoNsT. art. Ill, § 2 ("The judicial power shall extend to all cases ... arising 
under this Constitution, the Law of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."). 
55. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial power shall extend to ... Controversies to 
which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; be­
tween a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States; between 
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a 
State, or Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subject."). 
56. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy" Requirement in State Court 
Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REv. 263, 266 (1990) (suggesting that this ex­
planation of the difference between "cases" and "controversies" "seems conclusive"); John 
Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts and the Text 
of Article Ill, 64 U. Cm. L. REv. 203, 210, 220-47 (1997) ("Cases include all legal actions, civil 
and criminal, while controversies include only civil proceedings."); Daniel J. Meltzer, The 
History and Structure of Article Ill, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1569, 1575-76 (1990) (supporting this 
distinction and noting its consistency with the Judiciary Act of 1789); James E. Pfander, Re­
thinking the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REv. 555, 
605 (1994) (noting that "the term 'cases' includes both criminal and civil proceedings, 
whereas the term 'controversies' embraces only matters of a civil nature"); Sunstein, What's 
Standing, supra note 14, at 168. 
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in fact. It tells us nothing about whether the word "controversy" in 
Article III can be understood to require this kind of injury. 
Professor Robert Pushaw draws a different distinction between 
"cases" and "controversies." He contends that the key difference is 
that the primary judicial role in "controversies" is the resolution of 
particular disputes while the primary judicial role in "cases" is the 
exposition of legal norms. 57 Although there is some ambiguity in 
Pushaw's use of the term, he views "exposition" - the claimed ju­
dicial role in "cases" - as simply the interpretation and application 
of the law to particular facts, regardless of the existence of any pre­
existing private dispute, in order to secure the enforcement of that 
law.SS 
57. See Robert J. Pushaw, Article Ill's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Func­
tion of Federal Courts, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 447, 494 (1994) ("[T]he federal judiciary's 
primary role was to be exposition in 'Cases,' with a lesser function of resolving disputes in 
'Controversies."'). This distinction may be helpful in understanding why some heads of fed­
eral ·jurisdiction are defined by legal subject and some are defined by party status. In 
Pushaw's view, current standing doctrine takes concepts that make some sense as applied to 
"controversies" and erroneously applies them in "cases" as well. Id. at 519 ("The Court's 
basic problem lies in applying fiusticiability doctrines such as standing] - and their underly­
ing dispute resolution model of adjudication - exclusively to 'Cases' . . .  which primarily 
involve federal law declaration. Conversely, justiciability doctrines are not used where they 
would make the most sense: to limit the 'Controversies' (i.e., disputes) federal courts must 
resolve."). 
58. See, e.g., Robert Pushaw, Congressional Power Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A 
Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of Article III, 1997 BYU L. REv. 847, 851 
(parenthetically defining exposition to be "interpret[ing] and apply[ing]" the law) [herein­
after Pushaw, Congressional Power]; Pushaw, supra note 57, at 474 (defining exposition as 
"the process of determining, construing, and applying legal rules"); cf. Robert Pushaw, Jus­
ticiabi/ity and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORN. L. REv. 393, 399 
(1996) (parenthetically defining "judicial power" as "the interpretation and application of 
pre-existing legal rules to particular facts"). Pushaw treats "exposition" and "expound" as 
cognates; definition 3 of the word "expound" in THE OXFORD ENGLISH D1cnoNARY (2d ed. 
1989), is "to give a particular interpretation to," a usage it describes as "now chiefly in law." 
Pushaw might be read, however, to suggest that the judicial role in cases is not so much 
the enforcement of law through the issuance of judgments, but the explanation and elabora­
tion of legal norms, ideally in published opinions. See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 57, at 449 
(claiming that a judge's "primary role" in a "case" is to "answer the legal question presented" 
and that a court's "main function" in "cases" is "to declare the law in matters of national and 
international importance"); id. at 517 ("The expository function could be exercised solely in a 
public judicial proceeding, culminating in a published opinion."). Such a view of the judicial 
role would be wrong, see Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opin­
ion, 14 N.Y.U. L. REv. 123, 126 (1999) ("The operative legal act performed by a court is the 
entry of a judgment; an opinion is simply an explanation of reasons for that judgment."), and 
in a letter commenting on a prior draft of this article, Pushaw has stated that the interpreta­
tion of "exposition" contained in the text is the one he intended. Letter from Robert Pushaw 
to author, March 25, 1999, at 4; see also Pushaw, Congressional Power, supra, at 860 
(parenthetically defining "judicial power" as "the authority to render a final judgment after 
applying the law to particular facts"). Moreover, treating the judicial role in cases as enforce­
ment of law rather than explanation of law permits the analysis to extend readily to federal 
trial courts. As criminal prosecutions illustrate, federal trial courts have a major role in ap­
plying the law to particular facts in order to secure the enforcement of the law. Cf. Pushaw, 
supra note 57, at 527 n.377 (conceding that "federal district courts probably have at least as 
important a role in settling disputes as they do in interpreting federal law" and concluding 
that "my analysis principally applies to federal appellate courts"). 
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In criminal cases (and perhaps more generally in Article III 
"cases"), the judiciary is enforcing the sovereign's law rather than 
umpiring a preexisting dispute.s9 Thus, criminal prosecutions 
demonstrate that, at least when exercising jurisdiction over the 
"cases" enumerated in Article III, nothing in Article III limits the 
use of the federal judicial power to enforcement of the rights of 
individuals or prohibits the use of the federal judicial power to en­
force the majoritarian sovereign will. 
In short, if - as all concede - the United States can prosecute 
crimes in the federal courts, then a "case" within the meaning of 
Article III must include litigation that is based on nothing more 
than the "harm to the common concern for obedience to law,"60 
and the "abstract ... injury to the interest in seeing that the law is 
obeyed."61 
III. WHAT STANDING Is REALLY ABoUT: THE ARTICLE I 
AND II lssUES 
If current standing doctrine is so thoroughly wrong, why have so 
many Supreme Court Justices insisted that it is a fundamental as­
pect of constitutional separation of powers? I subinit that there are 
separation of powers concerns afoot, but they are more properly 
considered as arguments primarily about the meaning of Articles I 
and II, not Article III. 
A. The Article I Issue 
A number of scholars have persuasively argued that the 
Supreme Court's efforts to treat standing as a transsubstantive juris­
dictional issue are Inisguided. 62 They explain that the question of 
standing is best treated as a question indistinguishable from 
59. See Pfander, supra note 56, at 616 (noting that a clause that "refers to 'cases' ... thus 
deals primarily with the enforcement of federal law"); cf. Harrison, supra note 56, at 231-32 
(noting that "cases" include criminal prosecutions under federal statutes, state prosecutions 
met by federal defenses, and criminal prosecutions of foreign diplomatic or consular officers, 
while most "controversies" would be between individuals, so the term underlines the private 
nature of such disputes). 
60. Federal Election Commn. v. Akins, 118 S. Ct 1777, 1785 (1998) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
61. Akins, 118 S. Ct at 1786. I do not mean to attack all Article III justiciability doc­
trines; my criticism is limited to current standing doctrine. In particular, I have no quarrel 
with the ban on advisory opinion or the finality doctrine. See Hartnett, supra note 58, at 145-
46 (supporting these doctrines and noting that the "central feature that constitutes a 'case' or 
'controversy' is that it results in a judgment"). 
62. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 14, at 233 (injury-in-fact requirement "impedes rather 
than assists analysis" because question regarding injury "must be seen as part of the question 
of the nature and scope of the substantive legal right on which the plaintiff relies"); id. at 291 
(standing "is a question of substantive law"). 
2252 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:2239 
whether the party has a right of action.63 Phrased this way, the is­
sue is one of substantive and remedial law, not one of Article III 
jurisdiction. 64 
Such scholarly efforts to dismantle Article III standing doctrine 
and redirect attention to the issues of substantive and remedial law, 
however compelling on their own terms, do not make the separa­
tion of powers concerns that judges have forced into that doctrine 
disappear. Instead, the question becomes whether the judiciary 
may create rights of action and remedies on its own or whether it 
must instead wait for legislative action. 65 Some argue that the crea­
tion of rights of action and their accompanying remedies are (unless 
constitutionally required66) legislative questions left to Congress 
63. See, e.g., Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate 
Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 450-56 (1974) (standing question is whether 
there is private right of action); Fletcher, supra note 14, at 239 ("The essence of a standing 
inquiry is the meaning of the specific statute or constitutional provision upon which the plain­
tiff relies . . . .  "); Sunstein, Public Law, supra note 14, at 1475 ("[T]he existence of standing 
and the existence of a cause of action present the same basic question."); Sunstein, What's 
Standing, supra note 14, at 166 ("The relevant question is instead whether the law - gov­
erning statutes, the Constitution, or federal co=on law - has conferred on the plaintiffs a 
cause of action."); Wmter, supra note 14, at 1451 ("For over a hundred years, the metaphor 
of 'standing' was shorthand for the question of whether a plaintiff had asserted claims that a 
court of equity would enforce."); id. at 1470 ("'Standing' is and can only be a question about 
the legal rights at stake."). Cf. Maxwell L. Steams, Standing Back from the Forest: Jus­
ticiability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1309, 1382-83 (1995) (agreeing that standing is 
"inevitably substantive, rather than procedural," while contending that standing doctrine, by 
presumptively finding "no right to enforce the rights of others," "no right to prevent diffuse 
harms," and "no right to an undistorted market" works to prevent litigants from manipulat­
ing the path of the legal decisions). 
64. Professor Sunstein attempts to maintain a link with Article III, contending that if 
there is no cause of action, there is no "case" or "controversy." Sunstein, What's Standing, 
supra note 14, at 222. If a plaintiff fails to state a cause of action (or, under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, a claim upon which relief can be granted), the dismissal is on the merits, 
not for lack of jurisdiction. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (noting that it is "well 
settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and 
not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction"). 
65. See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 233 ("In significant part, a debate over what constitutes 
'injury in fact' sufficient for Article III is thus a debate about separation of powers and the 
respective responsibilities of Congress and the Court."). 
66. Individuals seeking to protect their own life and liberty have at least one constitution­
ally required right of action and remedy: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall 
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may re­
quire it." U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. It has been held that the Fifth Amendment's just 
compensation clause, U.S. CoNST. amend. 5, protects a constitutionally required right of ac­
tion and remedy for the protection of property, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987), but the historical accuracy of this description has 
recently been called into question. See Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The 
Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 V AND. L. REv. 
57 (1999). The extent to which the constitution requires the creation of additional rights of 
action and remedies is uncertain. See generally Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New 
Law, Non-Retroactivity and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HA.Rv. L. REv. 1733 (1991); John C. 
Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 1999). 
See also Sunstein, What's Standing, supra note 14, at 210 (arguing that it is "implausible to say 
that constitutional provisions create [private rights of action] when the relevant duty runs to 
the public as a whole rather than to affected individuals"). 
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under Article I,67 while others argue that, at least in the first in­
stance, courts properly create (or broadly infer) such rights of ac­
tion and remedies.6s 
So understood, the injury-in-fact requirement would be de­
moted from a constitutional rule to a principle of statutory con­
struction:69 in the absence of a clear statement from Congress to 
the contrary, the judiciary will infer rights of action only for the 
67. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-31 (1979) (Powell, J., 
dissenting) ("As the Legislative Branch, Congress . . .  should determine when private parties 
are to be given causes of action under legislation it adopts . . . .  When Congress chooses not to 
provide a private civil remedy, federal courts should not assume the legislative role of creat­
ing such a remedy."); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388, 427-30 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that, while Congress could create 
right of action for damages against federal officials for violating the fourth amendment, the 
Court may not do so); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
creation of right of action for damages is exercise of legislative power and "[l]egislation is the 
business of Congress"); cf. Karahalios v. National Fedn. of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 536 
(1989) (refusing to recognize a private right of action and noting that "Congress undoubtedly 
was aware . . .  that the Court had departed from its prior standard for resolving a claim 
urging that an implied statutory cause of action should be recognized, and that such issues 
were being resolved by a straightforward inqniry into whether Congress intended to provide 
a private cause of action"); Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 230 (1996) 
(Stevens, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) (implying a right of action under § 10 of 
the Voting Rights Act because Supreme Court precedent at the time the statute was enacted 
was much more receptive to such inferences than current precedent). 
See also Sunstein, Public Law, supra note 14, at 1475 ("[L]itigants do not have standing 
unless Congress or the Constitution has granted them a right to bring suit."); Wmter, supra 
note 14, at 1513 ("If standing is really about the right to be recognized and its concomitant 
remedies, then Congress, and not the Court, should have the ultimate power to define 
standing."). 
68. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (establishing four part test for implying 
right of action); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97 (implying private right of action for damages for 
violation of fourth amendment in absence of "explicit congressional declaration" to the con­
trary or "special factors counselling hesitation"); J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) 
(implying private right of action for damages as a "necessary supplement" to Securities & 
Exchange Commission enforcement); see also Henry Monaghan, Constitutional Common 
Law, 89 HAR.v. L. RE.v. 1, 24 (1975) (treating Bivens as a form of constitutional common law, 
inspired by the constitution but changeable by Congress); cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 111-
12 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("I would not be niggardly . . .  in giving private attorneys 
general standing to sue. I would certainly not wait for Congress to give its blessing to our 
deciding cases clearly within our Article III jurisdiction."); United States ex rel. Marcus v. 
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943) ("Statutes providing for a reward to informers which do 
not specifically either authorize or forbid the informer to institute the action are construed to 
authorize him to sue.") (citation omitted). 
69. See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 239 (suggesting that standing precedents "are useful as 
presumptions aids for construction"); see also id. at 252 (arguing that dismissals for lack of 
prudential standing are better described and understood as refusals to "infer a cause of ac­
tion absent a clear statutory directive"); cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 
1198-99 (1993) (arguing that all of the Court's opinions prior to Lujan were "consistent with 
the principle of legislative supremacy"). Such a demotion of the injury-in-fact requirement 
would be especially appropriate since the injury-in-fact requirement was born in an interpre­
tation of the Administrative Procedure Act. See Sunstein, What's Standing, supra note 14, at 
185-86 (discussing ADP v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)). 
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kinds of concrete, individualized, personal injuries that courts ex­
pect to see vindicated by private rights of action.70 
This, I think, is the essence of the position taken by Justice 
Harlan: (1) public actions are within a federal court's Article III 
jurisdiction,71 (2) federal courts should leave the creation of such 
rights of action to Congress,72 but (3) federal courts may infer pri­
vate rights of action when faced with a litigant who has suffered the 
kind of concrete, individualized, personal injury that courts are 
used to seeing vindicated by private rights of action.73 There is 
70. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 672 ("Denials of standing in cases involving novel interests 
foreign to the existing legal culture are therefore best understood as interpretations of the 
underlying statute."). Under this approach, Federal Election Commn. v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 
1777 (1998) is readily reconcilable with United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (re­
jecting taxpayer standing to litigate demand for regular statement and account from CIA): in 
Akins, but not in Richardson, there was a Congressionally created right of action. See Sun­
stein, supra note 12, at 642 (distinguishing Richardson from Akins and noting that if Richard­
son was decided correctly it was because "no source of law created a right to bring suit"); 
Leading Cases, supra note 12, at 261 (making this point). Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (noting that the Court must be "sensitive to the articulation of new 
rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our common-law tradition" but that "Con­
gress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the 
class of persons entitled to bring suit") (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
71. Flast, 392 U.S. at 130 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
72. Flast, 392 U.S. at 131 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("This Court has previously held that 
individual litigants have standing to represent the public interest, despite their lack of eco­
nomic or other personal interests, if Congress has appropriately authorized such suits."). 
Concededly, Justice Harlan's Flast opinion speaks in terms of "standing" rather than "rights 
of action." 
73. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 408 n.8 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[A] court of law vested with 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit has the power - and therefore the duty - to 
make principled choices among traditional judicial remedies."). Justice Harlan's emphasis on 
the personal interests involved in Bivens appears throughout the opinion. See Bivens, 403 
U.S. at 399 ("[A] traditional judicial remedy such as damages is appropriate to the vindica­
tion of the personal interests [involved]."); 403 U.S. at 408 (noting "personal interests" pro­
tected by fourth amendment); 403 U.S. at 409 (relying in part on "experience of judges in 
dealing with private trespass and false imprisonment claims"). 
It might be thought that a similar rule should apply to civil litigation brought by the 
United States. See United States v. San Jacinto Tm Co., 125 U.S. 273, 285 (1888) (suggesting 
that, in the absence of a Congressionally created right of action, the United States could only 
"institute such a suit . . .  upon the same general principles which authorize a private citizen to 
apply to a court of justice for relief'). Justice Field advocated even further restriction, refus­
ing to "recognize the doctrine that the Attorney General takes any power by virtue of his 
office except what the Constitution and the laws confer." San Jacinto, 125 U.S. at 307 (Field, 
J., concurring in the judgment). The most prominent case rejecting this limitation should give 
one pause before endorsing judicially-created rights of action to vindicate the public interest. 
See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (upholding injunction against Pullman strike of 1894 
without need for Congressionally created right of action). In Debs, the Supreme Court ex­
plicitly declined to rely on any Act of Congress, 158 U.S. at 600, or to place its decision solely 
on the property interest of the United States in the mail carried on the railways, preferring to 
rest its decision on broader grounds. 158 U.S. at 583-84. It reasoned that the "obligations 
which [the executive branch of the United States] is under to promote the interest of all, and 
to prevent the wrongdoing of one resulting in injury to the general welfare, is of itself suffi­
cient to give it a standing in court." Debs, 158 U.S. at 584. Compare CHARLES B LACK, 
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 24 (1969) (approving Debs by 
analogy to McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)) with RICHARD H. FAL· 
LON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
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much to be said for Justice Harlan's approach74 - not the least of 
which is that it was too conservative for the Warren Court and too 
liberal for the Rehnquist Court. 
Federal criminal prosecutions may have something to tell us 
about this debate. For one of the earliest, most significant, and 
most enduring decisions the federal judiciary has ever made was to 
leave the creation of criminal rights of action to Congress and to 
refuse to recognize a common law of federal crimes.75 To my mind, 
the example of criminal prosecutions suggests the wisdom of insist­
ing that it is the job of Congress, not the courts, to create rights of 
action to vindicate the public's interest in obedience to the law.76 
Yet even those who would distinguish criminal prosecutions 
from other public rights of action77 and encourage greater judicial 
creativity should, I believe, agree that this is the right set of ques­
tions to be asking - that what is truly at stake in current standing 
doctrine is not the meaning of "cases" and "controversies" in Arti­
cle III, but the extent (and possible exclusivity) of the legislative 
power of Article ps 
816 n.3 (4th ed. 1996) (suggesting that there is a difference between affirmative rights of 
action, as in Debs, and defenses, as in McCulloch). See also FALLON ET AL., supra, at 817 
(suggesting that the New York Trmes in the Pentagon Papers case, New York Trmes v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), perhaps should have argued that the United States 
needed a Congressionally created right of action before it could bring suit); Henry P. 
Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 65-66 (1993) (sug­
gesting that Debs can be "at least understood," if not defended, as an example of the protec­
tive power of the executive, without statutory authority, "to make contracts and, more 
importantly, to sue to protect the personnel and property interests of the United States, and 
when necessary to use force and other resources to protect them"). 
74. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 14, at 277 (describing Justice Harlan's opinion in Flast as 
"widely admired"). 
75. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) ("The 
legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and 
declare that Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence."); Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 
at 32 ("Although this question is brought up now for the first time to be decided by this 
Court, we consider it as having been long since settled in public opinion."). Significantly, the 
Court in Hudson & Goodwin was willing to assume, at least arguendo, an implied power in 
the United States to "preserve its own existence, and promote the end and object of its 
creation," but insisted that it did not follow that the courts could act without an act of legisla­
tion. 11 U.S. at 33-34. See also United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816) 
(refusing to draw Hudson & Goodwin into doubt). 
76. Cf. Steams, supra note 38, at 456 ("The injury in fact requirement . . .  is intended to 
protect Congress's power to govern. Critical to that power . . .  is the power not to make law 
unless and until an appropriate consensus forms."). 
77. See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 48, at 130 (suggesting that the executive should have a 
right of action to enforce constitutional rights, even if "there are occasions," such as criminal 
prosecutions, "when we might demand explicit congressional authority for suits to enforce 
federal statutes"). 
78. Of course, one might rephrase the question to concern the appropriate scope of "judi­
cial power" under Article III, and thus make it an Article III question. I don't deny that 
what I describe as an Article I question can be thought of as an Article III question, or 
(perhaps more precisely) as a question about the relative scope of Articles I and III. My 
point in labeling it an Article I rather than an Article III question is to highlight the fact that 
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Let us take stock of where we are. We have seen that there is 
no impediment in Article III to a federal court enforcing the law of 
the sovereign in the interests of the public, such as in a criminal 
case.79 We have also seen that the strongest conclusion that we can 
draw from Article I is that the judiciary should leave the creation of 
rights of action to· vindicate the public interest to Congress, as in the 
statutes creating federal crimes.so The constitutional question that 
remains to be addressed is "Who can constitutionally be empow­
ered to represent such public interests in court?" That is a question 
of the proper interpretation, not of Article III or Article I, but of 
Article II.81 
It is no coincidence that the Justice most dedicated to using the 
doctrine of standing to bar actions seeking to vindicate the public 
interest in law enforcement is the same Justice most dedicated to 
the unitary executive: Justice Scalia. Before taking his seat on the 
Supreme Court, Justice Scalia emphasized the importance of the 
doctrine of standing to the separation of powers. 82 On the Court, 
he authored the majority opinion in Lujan. 83 He is also a firm be­
liever in the unitary executive - the only Justice to conclude the 
independent counsel statute is unconstitutional because it gives 
purely executive functions to a person "whose actions are not fully 
within the supervision and control of the President. "84 Although he 
has denied that his views on standing are simply a dislocated ver­
sion of his views on the unitary executive,85 he has explicitly stated 
it has everything to do with the scope of the legislative power, and nothing to do with the 
meaning of the terms "case" and "controversy." 
79. See supra Part II. 
80. See supra section III.A. 
81. See Sunstein, What's Standing, supra note 14, at 213 ("[M]any of the recent standing 
cases might be thought to be Article II cases masquerading under the guise of Article III."). 
82. See Scalia, supra note 52, at 894. 
83. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 {1992). 
84. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 708 (1988). 
85. He wrote: 
Our opinion is not motivated, as Justice Stevens suggests, by the more specific sepa­
ration-of-powers concern that this citizen's suit "somehow interferes with the Execu­
tive's power to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,' Art. II, § 3 . . . .  " The 
courts must stay within their constitutionally prescribed sphere of action, whether or not 
exceeding that sphere will harm one of the other two branches. This case calls for noth­
ing more than a straightforward application of our standing jurisprudence, which, though 
it may sometimes have an impact on presidential powers, derives from Article III, and 
not Article II. 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt., 523 U.S. 83, 102 n.4 (1998) (quoting 523 U.S. at 129 
{Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)). Cf. Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of 
Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1793, 1806 {1993) (relying on Article II's 
unitary executive to conclude that "Congress should not be able to confer on private citizens 
the general power to vindicate rights shared by the public as a whole."). Clanton, supra note 
15, at 1040, n.251 (noting that a legislatively-created bounty might be a sufficient personal 
stake for an informer action, but relying on Article II to conclude that "separation of powers 
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that the reason (in his view) Congress cannot create citizen standing 
to vindicate the public interest is that such citizen standing would 
operate to transfer the President's most important duty: to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed.s6 
There is, of course, a large and ongoing debate about the mean­
ing of Article II. There are those, such as Justice Scalia, who con­
tend that Article II creates a unitary executive and that anyone 
exercising any part of national executive power must be answerable 
to the President.s7 There are others who contend that Article II is 
perfectly consistent with creating officers and agencies who admin­
ister the law with considerable autonomy from presidential con­
troi.ss In addition, there are those who are willing to accept, at least 
for purposes of argument, that the original understanding of Article 
II was a unitary one, but that modern conditions require the accept­
ance of greater autonomy of those with executive power.s9 There 
are even those who argue that the original understanding accepted 
considerable autonomy, but that modern conditions may call for a 
unitary executive.9o 
I do not attempt to resolve that debate, or even to enter into it. 
Instead, my point is that this is the right set of questions to be ask-
principles in the United States limit Congress' ability to give the public at large penalties to 
prosecute others for breaches of law"). 
86. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577. In his dissent in Akins, Justice Scalia reiterated the same 
concern. "A system in which the citizenry at large could sue to compel executive compliance 
with the law would be a system in which the courts, rather than the President, are given the 
primary responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' Art. II, § 3." 
Federal Election Commn. v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1791 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). A 
similar reliance on Article II appears in Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Alden v. 
Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240 (1999). There the Court held that Congress lacks the Article I power 
to authorize private litigants to bring suits for money damages against unconsenting states, 
but distinguished suits brought "in the name of the United States by those who are entrusted 
with the constitutional duty to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed,' U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 3." Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2267. 
87. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Exe­
cute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Struc­
tural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1153 (1992). 
88. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1792 
(1996) (arguing that history does not support a formalist interpretation of the separation of 
powers and that the "Constitution was a sketch that left the future resolution of separation of 
powers matters mainly to the processes inked in at the highest levels of the three branches"). 
89. See, e.g., Abner Greene, Checks & Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 
U. Cm. L. REv. 123, 128 (1994) ("[E]ven if in the nondelegation doctrine days Congress 
could not constitutionally regulate presidential control of agency officials . . .  in the post­
nondelegation doctrine world such congressional actions restore a proper balance of power 
consonant with the framers' view of checks and balances."). 
90. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 
94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 86 (1994) (arguing that the framers distinguished between executive 
power and administrative power, but suggesting that "[u]nder current circumstances, a 
strongly unitary executive is the best way of keeping faith with the most fundamental goals of 
the original scheme"). 
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ing - that what is truly at stake in current standing doctrine is not 
the meaning of Article III, but the meaning of Article II. 
Again, criminal cases illustrate the point. If Congress has, 
within the scope of its enumerated powers under Article I, created 
a federal crime, there is no constitutional impediment to its pro­
secution in a federal court. Even if no one has suffered a concrete 
particularized injury in fact and the only interest being vindicated is 
the general public interest in law enforcement, and even if the judi­
ciary would not infer a right of action absent the statute, there is a 
"case" within the meaning of Article III. The remaining constitu­
tional question is a question of Article II: Who can prosecute such 
crimes and thereby vindicate the general public interest? The pos­
sibilities include federal officials, private actors, and even Congress 
or its members.91 
Some might object that, regardless of the degree of indepen­
dence from the President a criminal prosecutor is permitted by 
Article II, the named party in the case will be the United States of 
America, not the particular individual prosecutor. On this view, the 
question is not who may prosecute crimes and vindicate the general 
public interest, but rather who is permitted to represent the United 
States. 
Perhaps so, but this rather formal distinction only highlights that 
the real issue is one under Article II, not Article III. For it would 
be a simple matter for Congress, any time it wishes to empower 
someone to vindicate the general public interest, to provide that the 
person may sue in the name of the United States.92 Indeed, this is 
precisely how the classic actions brought by private individuals to 
vindicate the public interest were (and often still are) captioned: 
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, quo warranto, qui tam, informer, 
and relator actions were all brought in the name of the sovereign.93 
91. State officials present another possibility, cf Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) 
(permitting Maine standing to appeal from a federal court of appeals judgment in a federal 
prosecution), but from the perspective of federal separation of powers, they can be assimi­
lated to private actors. Cf Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (holding, as a 
matter of federalism, that federal government cannot command state officers to enforce fed­
eral regulatory program). 
92. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 547(1) (1994) (authorizing United States attorneys, not citizens gener­
ally, to "prosecute for all offenses against the United States"). 
93. See, e.g., GEORGE E. HARRIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CERTIORARI AT COMMON 
LAW AND UNDER THE STATUTES § 1, at 2 (1893) (noting one definition of a writ of certiorari 
as "an original writ . . .  directed in the king's name" (quoting MATrHEW BACON, A NEW 
ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 162 (Sir Henry Gwyllin & Charles Edward Dodd eds., 1852) 
(1768))); JAMES L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES, EMBRACING 
MANDAMUS, Quo WARRANTO, AND PROHIBmON § 430, at 419 (3d ed. 1896) (explaining that 
mandamus proceedings are instituted in the name of the state or sovereign); id. § 697, at 653-
54 (noting the common law rule that quo warranto proceedings be instituted in the name of 
the state or sovereign power). Such writs also came to be used to protect private interests. 
See, e.g., HIGH, supra, § 430, at 419 (noting that use of the sovereign's name was treated as 
"merely nominal"); S.S. MERILL, LAW OF MANDAMUS § 228, at 286 (1892) (recognizing 
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On the other hand, perhaps, as the Court seemed to say in 
Buckley v. Valeo,94 only officers of the United States, and not pri­
vate individuals, can be constitutionally empowered to represent 
the United States in court. There is reason to doubt such a broad 
reading of Buckley, 95 particularly in light of subsequent doctrinal 
developments that emphasize the prevention of Congressional ag­
grandizement of power rather than Presidential control over the ex­
ecution of the law.96 But even if the broad reading of Buckley is 
correct, Congress may well be able to meet this formal requirement 
by simply vesting the power of appointment in the court where the 
action is filed.97 
"long-established" rule that a writ of mandamus "runs in the name of the state to protect 
private interests"). See also Clanton, supra note 15, at 1033-41. 
94. 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976) ("[P]rimary responsibility for conducting civil litigation in the 
courts of the United States for vindicating public rights .. . may be discharged only by per­
sons who are 'Officers of the United States'."). 
95. See Caminker, supra note 19, at 374-80 (doubting that Buckley should be understood 
as "enshrining a public/private interest distinction governing the appointments clause" and 
suggesting that a one-shot litigant without authority over government employees need not be 
an "officer"). See also, e.g., Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890) (person "without 
tenure, duration, continuing emolument, or continuous duties, and [who] acts only occasion­
ally and temporarily" is not "officer" of United States); United States ex reL Stillwell v. 
Hughes Helicopters, 714 F. Supp. 1084, 1095 ( C.D. Cal. 1989) (interpreting Buckley as 
"preventing Congress from attempting to enforce federal law"); United States ex reL Truong 
v. Northrop Corp., 728 F. Supp. 615, 623 ( C.D. Cal. 1989) (interpreting Court in Buckley as 
"concerned that Congress was encroaching impermissibly on executive branch functions"). 
Office of L egal Counsel, The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and 
Congress, 1996 WL 876050 at § IIBl & n.66 (preliminary print, May 7, 1996) (concluding that 
qui tam statute is constitutional under the best reading of Buckley, and explicitly disapprov­
ing prior OL C opinion to the contrary). 
96. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding independent counsel statute); 
B owsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that Congress may not place executive power 
in a person answerable to Congress); IN S  v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (permitting delega­
tion of Congressional authority to IN S  but invalidating legislative veto). See also Metropoli­
tan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 
(1991) (holding on basic separation of powers grounds that members of Congress may not sit 
on board that exercises executive power); Airports Auth., 501 U.S. at 277 n.23 (declining to 
address incompatibility cause, ineligibility clause, and appointments clause arguments); see 
generally Greene, supra note 89, at 126 (" Congress may give away legislative power and 
insulate such delegated power from total presidential control, but Congress may n[ot] draw 
executive power to itself."); L essig & Sunstein, supra note 90, at 115-16 (arguing that 
preventing Congress from having a role in the enforcement of law both preserves liberty and 
reduces the incentives toward Congressional delegation). 
97. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2 ("[T]he Congress may by L aw vest the Appointment of such 
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of L aw, or in the 
Heads of Departments."). Such a mechanism would not be valid if the litigant to be ap­
pointed were considered a principal officer, who must be appointed by the President, see 
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997), or if inferior officers may only be ap­
pointed by their superiors. See Akhil Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L .  REv. 747, 805 
(1999) (arguing that inferior officers may only be appointed by their superiors); Akhil Amar, 
Some Opinions on the Opinions Clause, 82 VA. L. REv. 647, 669 (1996) (arguing that "inter­
branch appointments are ruled out by the relational word 'inferior' "). But see Morrison v. 
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 673-74 (1988) (permitting interbranch appointments); see also Act of 
June 24, 1898, ch. 495 § 2, 30 Stat. 487, current version at 28 U.S.C. 546(d) (providing for 
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Others might object that I am missing a crucial distinction be­
tween criminal prosecutions and the kinds of cases in which the 
Court has erected its standing doctrine: unlike criminal prosecu­
tions, the Court�s standing cases have often involved actions against 
an official of the federal government seeking to control that offi­
cial's action. I concede, of course, that many (though certainly not 
all) of the Court's standing cases have involved federal officials as 
defendants and that the Court seems particularly concerned about 
using the judicial power to enforce the public interest against such 
officials.98 But this distinction turns back on itself. If it is the de­
fendant's status as a federal official that is driving the decision, it is 
even clearer that the issue concerns Article II: Who has the power 
to ensure that the official respects the public interest in compliance 
with the law?99 
Although it may seem odd to even contemplate, another poten­
tial candidate for representing the public interest in compliance 
with the law is Congress or its members. Despite its oddity, this 
approach, unlike the claimed "personal injury" requirement of 
Article ill, may help illuminate the difficult area of Congressional 
standing.10° For if Congress has the Article I power to create rights 
interim appointment of United States Attorney by district court). Yet again, this highlights 
that the debate is better focused on Article II than on Article III. 
98. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wiidlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) ("[I]n suits against 
the government, at least, the concrete injury requirement must remain."); Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984) (suit against Secretary of Treasury and Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue). 
99. See Sunstein, What's Standing, supra note 14, at 231 ("[I]f Article III does indeed 
require a personal stake, the identification of the defendant should not matter."). It might be 
thought that there is an Article III difference in that "judicial power" does not include the 
power to command executive discretion. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 
(1803) ("[T]he province of the courts is • . •  not to inquire how the executive, or executive 
officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion."). But the scope of executive discre­
tion is defined "by the constitution and law," Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170 - that is, by Article II 
and law enacted pursuant to Article I. Thus Article III is not doing any independent work. 
There may nonetheless be an Article III issue lurking here: if both sides of the "v." are 
controlled by the same person, the case may be considered feigned. See generally Michael 
Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself?, 32 WM. 
& MARY L. REv. 893, 917-18 (1991) (exploring the possibility that intragovernmental dis­
putes are not justiciable but generally rejecting it); William K. Kelley, The Constitutional 
Dilemma of Litigation Under the Independent Counsel System, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1197, 1255 
(1999) (arguing that, for Article III purposes, "the better way to consider whether the parties 
could properly litigate against one another is . . .  whether one of them, or an officer superior 
to them, has the authority in law to dictate the outcome without resorting to court"). 
100. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2317 (1997) (concluding that members of 
Congress lacked standing to challenge the line-item veto, despite an Act of Congress provid­
ing for such an action, because they lacked a "personal injury"). See The Supreme Court: 
Leading Cases, 111 HARv. L. REv. 197, 218 (1997) ("[T]he law of legislative standing after 
Raines is a doctrine fraught with analytical inconsistency and uncertain boundaries."). De­
spite a clear opportunity to do so this year, the Court did not attempt to clarify Congressional 
standing in Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 119 S. Ct. 765 
(1999). Instead, the court consolidated two cases involving challenges to the use of sampling 
in the 2000 census, one brought by the House of Representatives and another brought by 
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of action to vindicate the public interest and Article III permits fed­
eral courts to hear such actions, it might seem - unless we adopt a 
unitary view of the executive under Article II - that Congress 
could give itself (or its members) such rights of action against exec­
utive officials. But if we stop looking for a "personal injury" that 
we mistakenly think Article III requires, we might more profitably 
inform our analysis of congressional standing by asking other ques­
tions: Has Congress actually provided for such a right of action 
and, if not, is it appropriate for the judiciary to create one?101 May 
Congress or its members constitutionally be empowered to bring 
actions to vindicate the public interest in seeing that the law is 
obeyed?102 
various voters. It decided the case brought by the voters on the merits, and, in light of that 
disposition, dismissed the case brought by the House for want of a "substantial federal ques­
tion," without addressing the standing of the House. Dept. of Commerce, 119 S. Ct. at 779. 
Only Justices Stevens and Breyer concluded that the House had standing "to challenge the 
validity of the process that will determine the size of each State's Congressional delegation." 
Dept. of Commerce, 119 S. Ct. at 789 (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., dissenting). Although 
Justices Ginsburg and Souter agreed with Justice Stevens on the merits, they agreed with the 
majority - but without explanation - that the case filed by the House should be dismissed. 
Dept. of Commerce, 119 S. Ct. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J, dissenting). It ap­
pears that, having lost on the merits in the case brought by the various voters, they accepted 
that decision as precedent in the case brought by the House. For an exploration of when a 
judge should treat a prior decision in which her position was rejected as a baseline for further 
decisions, see Suzanna Sherry, Justice O'Connor's Dilemma: The Baseline Question, 39 WM. 
& MARY L. REv. 865 (1998). Cf. Hartnett, supra note 58, at 141-45 (arguing that judges in a 
single case should not vote on each issue and accept the majority resolution of each issue, but 
instead should adhere to the tradition of simply voting on the judgment). 
101. This question seems to have been all but ignored in the congressional standing cases 
in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See, e.g., Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (permitting Senate and members of Congress standing to challenge pocket 
veto), vacated, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); Barnes, 759 F.2d at 41 (Bork, J., dissenting) (decrying 
Congressional standing); Moore v. United States House of Rep., 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (permitting members of Congress standing to sue the two Houses and their officers to 
enforce the origination clause), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); Moore, 733 F.2d at 956 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting to such standing); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974) (permitting member of Congress standing to challenge pocket veto); see also 
Chenoworth v. Clinton, 1999 WL 446007 (D.C. Cir. July 2, 1999) (treating reasoning of 
Moore and Kennedy as repudiated by Raines). Congress, of course, is not likely to create 
rights of action against itself, its Houses, or its officers. Nor is the President likely to sign bills 
creating Congressional rights of action against the executive. The major exception would 
seem to be if Congress and the President are eager for a judicial resolution of a constitutional 
question, as they may have been concerning the line-item veto. See 2 U.S.C. § 692(a)(l) 
(Supp. 1998) (providing that any Member of Congress may sue to challenge line-item veto 
statute). Such a situation, however, may simply take us out of the standing frying pan into 
the advisory opinion fire. See Neal Devins & Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph of Timing: 
Raines v. Byrd and the Modem Supreme Court's Attempt to Control Constitutional Confron­
tations, 86 GEO. LJ. 351, 351 (1997) (stating that in enacting a statutory grant of standing to 
members of Congress in the 1996 Line Item Veto Act, "Congress effectively asked the Court 
. . .  to determine whether [the] proposed legislation was constitutional"); Fletcher, supra note 
14, at 283-90 (suggesting that when Congress enacts a law providing for Congressional stand­
ing, it resembles a request for advisory opinions). 
102. Shifting the focus from Article III also offers a way to reconcile the denial of Con­
gressional standing in Raines with the recognition of state legislative standing in Coleman v. 
Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (holding that a block of twenty state senators from Kansas had 
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Even if Article II permits individuals with considerable indepen­
dence from the President to represent the United States and vindi­
cate the public interest in court, however, members of Congress 
(and Congress itself) could be precluded from exercising this power 
themselves. First, if Article II requires that only officers of the 
United States represent the United States in vindicating the public 
interest in court,103 then the incompatibility clause104 prevents 
members of Congress from bringing such actions. But even if such 
a litigant need not be an officer, it does not follow that such a liti­
gant can be a member of Congress. The Supreme Court has been 
far more tolerant when Congress gives law enforcement powers to 
those with some independence from the president than when it at­
tempts to give itself or its members a role in the enforcement of the 
law.105 
standing to seek to compel a state official to certify that a federal constitutional amendment 
had not been ratified where the state senate voted twenty to twenty and the Lieutenant 
Governor cast a deciding vote in favor of the amendment). In Coleman, which involved state 
legislators, there was no federal separation of powers issue. Cf. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2319-20 
& n.8 {distinguishing Coleman on the grounds that the voting block in Coleman was sufficient 
to control the outcome if they were correct that the Lieutenant Governor was not part of the 
legislature for purposes of ratifying a federal constitutional amendment, and noting that it 
"need not decide whether Coleman may also be distinguished" on the ground that it "has no 
applicability to a similar suit brought by federal legislators, since the separation-of-powers 
concerns present in such a suit were not present in Coleman"). 
Of course, there is always the question whether any particular Congressionally-created 
right of action is best understood as an attempt to empower itself or its members to vindicate 
the public interest. Cf. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2323 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(stating that members of Congress are "not simply claiming harm to their interest in having 
government abide by the Constitution," and that it is "fairly debatable" whether their injury 
is "sufficiently personal and concrete to give them standing" and therefore "resolv[ing] the 
question under more general separation-of-power principles"). 
103. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97. 
104. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6 ("(N]o Person holding Office under the United States, shall 
be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office."). For an argument that the 
incompatibility clause is "the cornerstone of the entire American constitutional structure," 
see Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or 
Separation of Personnel?, 79 CoRNELL L. REv. 1045, 1157 {1994). While the Supreme Court 
has held that citizens and taxpayers lack standing to bring an action challenging Congres· 
sional membership in the military reserve based on the incompatibility clause, Schlesinger v. 
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), this does not mean that a court 
should ignore the incompatibility clause when adjudicating a claim brought by a member of 
Congress. Reservists, like other standing decisions, is better understood as a judicial refusal 
to create a public right of action to enforce the incompatibility clause; it should not bar a 
defensive challenge to the authority of a member of Congress under that clause. There is a 
significant difference between creating a right of action and recognizing that a defendant may 
object to the constitutional authority of the plaintiff to bring the action against him. See 
FALLON ET AL., supra note 73, at 816 n.3 (suggesting that there is a difference between af· 
firmative rights of action and defenses); Calabresi & Larsen, supra, at n.12 (stating that if a 
member of Congress was acting as an officer of the United States and "taking government 
action that bore down on the life, liberty, or property rights of a private individual . • •  we 
would have no doubt that the private individual so affected would have standing to defend 
against the government action on the ground that it was unconstitutional because of a viola· 
tion of the Incompatibility Clause."). 
105. See supra note 96. 
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CONCLUSION 
Perhaps it is unduly optimistic to think that there is any hope of 
dislodging the current standing doctrine. After all, scholars far 
more prominent than I have been trying for years. But there are 
glimmers of hope, and those glimmers have appeared (I think) pre­
cisely in the cracks of standing doctrine explored above. 
First, Justice Souter has observed that the injury-in-fact require­
ment is very difficult to apply sensibly to official capacity actions.106 
This observation is a step toward recognizing that the injury-in-fact 
requirement cannot be sensibly applied as an Article III require­
ment to any case which seeks to vindicate the public interest in law 
enforcement. 
Second, Justice Stevens has observed that what really seems to 
be motivating Justice Scalia's views on standing is his commitment 
to a unitary theory of Article II.107 This observation is a step to­
ward recognizing that what is really at stake in current standing 
doctrine has everything to do with Articles I and II, and nothing to 
do with the meaning of "case" and "controversies" in Article III. 
Finally, while the Court last year retained an Article III bar to 
standing where the "harm at issue is not only widely shared, but is 
also of an abstract and indefinite nature - for example, harm to 
the common concern for obedience to law,"108 it also made clear 
that in other circumstances, Congress can authorize standing to liti­
gate a generalized grievance. In so doing, it partially retreated from 
the view of Article III articulated by Justice Scalia for the Court in 
Lujan. Once the retreat has begun, there is greater hope, perhaps, 
for its continuance.109 
106. See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2323 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) ("There is, 
first, difficulty in applying the rule that an injury on which standing is predicated be personal, 
not official."); Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2323 n.2 ("[A]n injury to official authority may support 
standing for a government itself or its duly authorized agents."). The cases which Justice 
Souter relies upon to support the standing of officials, however, are cases that arose in the 
context of a state official seeking review in the Supreme Court of the United States, in his 
official capacity, of a judgment of his own state's court. For a discussion of these cases argu­
ing that the Supreme Court should not have abandoned its earlier doctrine barring such cases 
from its jurisdiction, see Edward A. Hartnett, Why ls the Supreme Court of the United States 
Protecting State Judges from Popular Democracy?, 75 TEXAS L. REv. 907, 957-71 (1997). 
107. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt., 523 U.S. 83, 129 (1998) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court might be 
"rooted in another separation of powers concern: that this citizen suit somehow interferes 
with the Executive's power to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"'). 
108. Federal Election Commn. v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1785 (1998) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
109. Cf. Leading Cases, supra note 12, at 262-63 (applauding the "subtle move away" 
from Lujan in Akins, while noting failure to "retreat squarely from it"); Sunstein, supra note 
12, at 674 (proclaiming that "the Akins decision deserves a more general celebration"). 
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Focusing on Articles I and II rather than Article III does not 
provide any simple answers. But we certainly have a far better 
chance of finding the right answers if we stop looking in the wrong 
place. 
